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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
PROVO CITY, a municipal corporation of the State of Utah,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
HUBERT C. LAMBERT, State Engineer of the State of Utah,
Case No. 14,023

Defendant-Appellant
PROVO RIVER WATER USERS ASSOCIATION, a corporation; KENNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION, a corporation; SALT LAKE CITY, a
municipal corporation; and,
CENTRAL UTAH WATER CONSERVANCY
DISTRICT, a public corporation
of the State of Utah,
Intervenors-Appellants.
PETITION FOR REHEARING

COMES now the respondent, Provo City, by and through its attorney, Jackson Howard, pursuant to Rule 76(e) of the Utal Rules
of Civil Procedure, and petitions the Court for a rehearing of
the above-mentioned cause and alleges that the Court erred in the
following particulars:
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN ASSUMING THAT THE RESPONDENT, PROVO CITY,
RECEIVED NOTICE OF THE ISSUANCE OF CERTIFICATION OF APPROPRIATION
NO. 3686.
The Court's prior decision appears to be based on the assumption that the respondent received notice of the issuance of
Certificate No. 3686.

There is nothing in the record which would

substantiate that fact.

Respondent has found no record that
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would establish that it ever did receive notice of the issuance
of the certificate and, therefore, denies that it received notice
and also denies that the certificate was found in its archives.
The reason no protest was entered by Provo City was because
it undoubtedly never received the certificate when it was issued.
It is also obvious that the Provo River Commissioner never received notice of the issuance of the certificate because he continued to deliver approximately 784 acre/feet of water to Provo
City.

The burden of proof is upon the appellants to show that

Provo City did, in fact, receive the certificate.

That is an

issue that can only be determined by remanding this cause to the
trial court for a complete hearing.
Since there has been no trial in this case, and because
there was no affidavit from either party on this subject, this
particular question is a justiciable issue of fact.

Because this

is a material question* disputed and justiciable, the Court
should remand the matter to the trial court for an evidentiary
hearing.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED BY DISREGARDING PREVIOUS CASE LAW THAT WOULD
ALLOW THE REFORMATION OF A CERTIFICATE OF APPROPRIATION.
The Court's prior decision rejects its prior authorities
that would permit the reformation of a certificate of appropriation that was erroneously issued.

Even if the appellants could

prove, which they cannot, that respondent received Certificate
No. 3686, the prior case law established by this Court would
still allow an equitable proceeding based upon the principles of
mistake.

Respondent has cited the case of Warren Irrigation Co.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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v. Charlton, 58 Utah 113, 197 P.2d 1030 (1921), on page 14 of its
prior brief.

The issue there was whether an opposing party could

attack or set aside a certificate of appropriation of another.
This Court held that an opposing party could not attack the certificate, but that the party with a direct interest in the certificate (which would include the party to whom it is issued)
could have a certificate reformed because of a mistake, fraud, or
misconstruction of the law.

This Court has now rejected its

prior position in Warren Irrigation Co. with no discussion as to
why that principle is no longer applicable or considered good
law.

The Warren Irrigation Co. case was decided in 1921, when

the same 60-day review period for decisions of the State Engineer
was in effect.

(See Complied Laws of Utah, §3459, 1917)

The result of Warren Irrigation Co. and the prior decision
in this case is to make a certificate of appropriation a "sacred
cow" that cannot be attacked upon any grounds. Warren Irrigation
Co. states that a certificate of appropriation cannot be attacked
collaterally, and the decision in this case says that a certificate cannot be directly attacked if an action is not brought
within 60 days.

Such is the result, regardless of fraud, mistake

of fact, mistake of law, estoppel or other equitable principles.
Mistake of fact and misconstruction of the law are the obvious grounds upon which this cause of action should be remanded
to the trial court.
POINT III
THE COURT'S DECISION, IN EFFECT, ESTABLISHED A NEW AND
INSIDIOUS LAW OF NOTICE WITH RESPECT TO WATER RIGHTS.
A.

One item of notice that was not treated by the Court is
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whether the State Engineer's past and present practice of issuing
its "Memorandum Decisions" and its "Certificates of Appropriation
is proper.

The present and past practice of the State Engineer

was to advise the protestants and applicants involved in a "Memorandum Decision".

This decision has always been accompanied by

written notice warning those involved of their right to appeal
the decision to the district court, if such is done within 60
days.

In this case, when the final certificate of appropriation

was issued, no such warning notice was given to Provo City or any
other interested party.

If the procedure in this case is given

judicial approbation, then the door is open to a procedure which,
if adopted as a common procedure, could do irreparable harm for
many appellants who are not represented by counsel and generally
unaware of the procedural requirement for appeal.
If this Court is to hold that the issuance of a certificate
is a "decision" of the State Engineer, it should be treated as
such and the applicant who received a certificate should be advised of the time limits for appeal.
B.

Another item that the Court does not address is the

problem which will occur if protestants should not receive notice
of the issuance of a certificate of appropriation to. another party.

As the practice now stands, the protectant does not receive

notice of the issuance of a certificate.

The Court in this case

apparently finds that practice to be acceptable.

The result is

that there are now different standards of notice for a "Memorandum Decision" and a "Certificate of Appropriation," yet they
both, by reason of this decision , constitute a "decision" that
is governed by the provisions of §73-3-14 and &73-3-15, Utah Code
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Annotated, 1953.
Appellants have responded to this argument by saying that if
a protestant is concerned about the issuance of a certificate of
appropriation, he can follow it up on his own.

Such reasoning

cuts both ways and can easily be applied to the "Memorandum Decision" issued by the State Engineer.

If the protestant is con-

cerned about another party's application, he can also easily follow it up on his own to determine what the State Engineer's "decision" is on that particular application.
Respondent believes this decision confuses the rule by establishing a double standard of notice.

The approval of a pro-

cedure that does not require notice flies in the teeth of what we
commonly think of as due process.

Respondent believes the Court

should clarify these issues if it is to find that the issuance of
a certificate of appropriation has the same status as a "Memorandum Decision" of the State Engineer.
POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES
THAT GOVERN THIS CASE.
Respondent has previously stated in this brief that it never
received notice of the issuance of Certificate No. 3686.

Since

notice of receipt is a disputed fact, the equitable principles of
estoppel and mutual mistake clearly provide a sound basis for
trial in the district court.

The district court was correct in

reaching its conclusion regarding the same question.
Respondent also requests the Court to more closely scrutinize
the cases of Eardley v. Terry, 94 Utah 367, 77 P.2d 362 (1938)
and United States v. Cappaert, 508 F.2d 313 (1974).
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Assuming

that this Court finds that the issuance of a certificate is a
"decision11 of the State Engineer (which respondent vigorougly
opposes; see page 10 of respondent's prior brief), both cases
explicitely state that an action to review a "decision" of the
State Engineer can subsequently be brought even after the 60-day
review period has passed.

The logic and reasoning in those cases

are directly applicable to the instant case.
The legislative intent of §73-3-14 and §73-3-15, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, was not to bar all actions brought after the 60day review period, but only to prevent delaying and harrassing
actions that would inhibit appropriators and applicants from trying to perfect their rights.

There always remains an independent

action for injunctive relief if someone interfers with another
party's rights.
supra.

That is the law as expressed in Eardley v. Terry,

The prejudicial delaying action of the State Engineer and

his subsequent taking of the City's water gives Provo City valid
grounds to have its certificate reviewed by a court of equity.
POINT V
THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING A CAUSE OF ACTION THAT PRESENTS
A JUSTICIABLE ISSUE OF FACT AND WHICH ISSUE IS OF UNIQUE PUBLIC
INTEREST.
This Court has, in effect, rendered summary judgment in a
cause that includes a multitude of factual issues that are in
dispute.

With respect to motions to dismiss, it is commonly un-

derstood that a complaint should only be dismissed when "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts
in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief".

Con-

ley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80,
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84 (1957).

The applicable law is also found in 61 Am.Jur.2d,

Pleading, §227.
[T]he motion will be denied if the Court is
called on to dispose of issues of fact raised by the pleadings in advance of a hearing
in due course. In other words, where a vital
and undetermined issue of fact is presented
by the pleadings, a judgment should not be
permitted to rest on an issue of law alone
• • • In other words, all facts alleged and
all the reasonable inferences and implications therefrom are to be considered most
strongly in favor of the plaintiff since the
remedy sought by the defendant is a drastic
one. (emphasis added)
This Court has continually expressed its reluctance to render summary judgment when a justiciable issue is before it, as
stated in Holbrook v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, _____ Utah 2d

____:

It is not the purpose of the summary
judgment procedure to judge the credibility
of the averments of parties, or witnesses,
or the weight of evidence. Neither is it
to deny parties the right to a trial to resolve disputed issues of fact. Its purpose
is to eliminate the time, trouble and expense
of trial when upon any view taken of the facts
as asserted by the party ruled against, he
would not be entitled to prevail. Only when
it so appears, is the court justified in refusing such a party the opportunity of presenting his evidence and attempting to persuade the fact trier to his views. Conversely, if there is any dispute as to any issue,
material to the settlement of the controversy, the summary judgment should not be granted.
In addition to the factual issues that must be resolved,
this case presents an issue of significant public importance.
Public policy as expressed by the Utah State Constitution, Article XI, §6, states that the municipalities are to keep their water and are prohibited from disposing of their water in any way.
The obvious reason for such a provision in the constitution is to
protect the fundamental life needs and the dollar investments
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of the citizens*

Similar purposes are accomplished on the State

and Federal level by principles of sovereignity and immunity.
Yet this Court, in this decision, and the State Engineer have
developed means to work a forfeiture of Provo Cityfs water right
and are quick to deprive the citizens of their assets and investments without allowing Provo City to present its case.

The sig-

nificance of this right, the public interest involved, and the
obvious justiciable issue should dictate that this Court follow
its previous opinions in respect to summary judgment.

The de-

cision in this case is even more difficult to understand when the
Supreme Court allows summary judgment vis-a-vis the finding of
justiciable fact by the lower and trial court, which is traditionally the fact-finding court.
CONCLUSION
The Court has erred in assuming facts of notice that are not
in the record and that are denied by the respondent.
clearly improper on a motion to dismiss.

This is

The Court has also

disregarded its own prior decisions by not considering the equitable principles inherent in controversies concerning water
rights and disputed issues of fact.

The only practical approach

to the cause before this Court is to allow the respondent to show
the trial court where the State Engineer erred in his calculations and in the issuance of Certificate of Appropriation No.
3686.

Respondent requests this cause be remanded for such a

hearing.
Respectfully submitted,
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